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libel is injury to reputation7 2 the notion that it is pecuniary loss,
presumed or otherwise, is ingrained into a large portion of modern
judicial thinking. The ultimate significance of this may be an
eventual abandonment of the distinction between injurious falsehood
treatment of all actions based upon words as
and defamation, and the
73
slander.
or
libel
either
ALFRED

H. KNIGHT, III

TAX AND OTHER LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
A clear and concise statement of the general rule concerning the
corporate practice of medicine' is found in 13 American Jurisprudence, as follows:
Section 837. While a corporation is in some sense a person and for
many purposes is so considered, yet, as regards the learned profession
which can only be practiced by persons who have received a license to do
so after an examination as to their knowledge of the subject it is recognized that a corporation cannot be licensed to practice such a profession ....

A corporation cannot be licensed to carry on the practice of medicine.
Nor, as a general rule, can it engage in the practice of medicine,
surgery, or dentistry through licensed employees.2

Despite this prevailing rule many medical practices have taken on
the corporate form. Charitable and university hospitals which hire
and pay salaries to doctors who treat patients are numerous. Large
corporations employ medical staffs and build hospitals in order to
furnish medical care for their employees. Also many health insurance
plans and groups of physicians practicing in clinics are set up in
the corporate form. More often than not the legality of these
practices has not been questioned by the courts and even when
questioned the practices are upheld.3
72. See note 64 supra.
73. This abandonment seems to have already in effect occurred in libel
cases where the language is non-defamatory, and the court holds that it is
not libelous per se, but permits recovery on the basis of special damages.
E.g., Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318, 304 P.2d 926 (1956); Barteck v. Personal Fin. Co. of Toledo, 60 Ohio App. 197, 20 N.E.2d 259 (1938).
1. Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice of Medicine, 5 LAW & CONTErP. PROB. 516 (1939); Note, 7 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 120 (1939); Note, 37 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1939); Note, 3 VILL. L. REV. 548
(1958); Note, 48 YALE L.J. 346 (1938); 40 IOWA L. REV. 663 (1955); 17 N.C.L.
REV. 183 (1939).
2. See 1 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 2525 (1939).

3. WILLcox, HOSPITALS AND THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, AHA
Hospital Monograph Series No. 1 (1957), at 30. This monograph is to be
republished in the Spring issue of the Cornell Law Quarterly. Letter from
Alanson W. Willcox to the Vanderbilt Law Review, March 21, 1960.
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In view of the exceptions being made to the general rule and
also the apparently direct violations thereof, it is felt a discussion
of the reasons for the rule and the arguments against it would be
timely.
Basically, the rule against the corporate practice of medicine is
designed to prevent any interference with the confidential relationship between a doctor and his patient and any usurpation of the
loyalty a doctor owes his patient by a corporate entity.4 Another
strong underlying reason for the rule is that corporate management
could give laymen control over physicians which could result in
commercial exploitation of the profession. 5 In the great majority of
states, there is no statute expressly prohibiting the corporate practice
of medicine. The rule is usually enforced by court interpretation of a
medical licensure statute.6 Most often the statute authorizes licensing
of certain "persons"; the courts interpret this to mean only human
7
beings and so deny licenses to corporations.
The corporate practice rule has been criticized as a legal fiction
since the courts apply it only when faced with exploitation of the
doctor's skills by a corporation in a "profit-taking" scheme which
would have a general adverse effect on public health.8 This position is
strongly supported by the fact that only two cases have been found
where corporate practices by non-profit organizations have been held
illegal.9 This position also finds support in numerous cases1 0 and
4. State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433, 225
S.W.2d 263 (1949); State Bd. of Optometry v. Gilmore, 147 Fla. 776, 3 So. 2d
708 (1941).
5. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. App. 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938);

Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 329, 2 N.W.2d 337, 346 (1942).
6. This article does not undertake to cite and analyze the positions of every
state on this subject, but a comprehensive study of the state standings on the
problem can be found in AMA BuREAu OF LEGAL MEDICINE AND LEGISLATION,

A

STUDY

STATES

RELATING TO THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED

(1956).

7. State ex rel. Loser v. National Optical Stores Co., 189 Tenn. 433, 225
S.W.2d 263 (1949); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-605 (1956).
8. Hansen, Group Health Plans-A Twenty-Year Legal Review, 42 MINN.
L. Rsv. 527, 536 (1958).
9. WILLcox, HOsPITALS Am THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE, AHA
Hospital Monograph Series No. 1 (1957). The author cites as the only clear
exception an unreported Iowa case, Iowa Hosp. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Med.
Examiners, Nov. 28, 1955. A more dubious exception, also unreported, is
Spears Free Clinic v. Denver Better Business Bureau, District Ct. Colo., Oct.
1955, since there was a strong suspicion of quackery on the part of the clinic.
10. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 714 (D.C. Cir.
1940), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The court stated: "[I]n all the cases we
have examined in which the practice has been condemned, the profit objective of the offending corporation has been shown to be its main purpose
.
" Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D.D.C. 1938);
Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Med. Soc'y, 43 Cal.2d 201, 209,
272 P.2d 497, 501 (1954); See also People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal.2d
156, 160, 82 P.2d 429, 431 (1938); Group Health Co-op v. King County Med.
Ass'n, 39 Wash.2d 586, 603, 237 P.2d 737, 778 (1951).
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opinions of state attorneys general.'
It would seem therefore that
the courts have added an exception to the rule which is all but
universally accepted. There are those, however, who believe the rule
should be abolished or at least have its application limited so as not
to include hospitals or corporations composed entirely of medical
12
practitioners.
Most often the agreement over the merits of the corporate practice
rule finds the physician and the American Medical Association in
favor of the rule against the corporate practice of medicine and the
13
hospitals and the American Hospital Association against the rule.
The physicians, however, have at times been heard to decry the inequity of a federal income tax scheme which will not allow them to
take advantage of employee pension plans so as to defer taxation on a
part of their income until they have retired. These pension plans
could only be utilized by a physician if he was an employee and in
states which prohibited the corporate practice of medicine he could
not be an employee.
The requirements of a qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock
bonus plans are set out in section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Section 402, on the taxability of beneficiaries of employees'
trusts, provides that the beneficiary of the plan will be taxed only on
the amount actually distributed or made available to him in the year
so distributed or made available. 14 He will not be taxed on the
employee's contribution even though the employer may deduct the
contribution in the year paid. 15 Thus, it is possible for an employee to
take advantage of this income-spreading device and postpone the
taxation of a part of his income until he retires while also getting a
16
lower tax bracket in the year the income is earned.
Under new proposed regulations 7 promulgated by the Internal
Revenue Service, the tax benefits of section 40218 are now available
to an association of physicians in those states where the corporate
practice of medicine is illegal. In short the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue now takes the position that, regardless of whether an "association" of doctors is a corporation under local state law, if the
organization meets the criteria of his new regulations it will be
11. Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 9211B (Oct. 5, 1955); 33 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 43
(Dec. 9, 1955).
12. See Laufer, supra note 1; WmLLcox, op. cit. supra note 3.
13. Taylor, Who's Winning the War Over Corporate Practice? Medical
Economics, Dec. 1957, p. 162.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 802(a) (1).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404.
16. The prerequisites for a qualified plan are set out in INT. REV. CODE

OF

1954, § 401 and certain limitations on the deductibility of employer's contributions are provided in § 404 but in spite of these restrictions a sizable tax
saving may still be obtained.
17. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 833 (1959).
18. See note 14 supra.
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treated as a corporation for purposes of qualifying an employee
pension plan for the favorable tax treatment under section 402. In
view of the extended and expensive training period and the comparatively short productive career, during which a physician is in an
extremely high tax bracket, the value of deferring taxation on a
portion of his income until his later and less productive period of
life is obvious. For a clear understanding of the new regulations, it
will be necessary to trace their historical development.
The provision of the Internal Revenue Code making this incomespreading device available to employees is the same in both the 1939
and 1954 Codes, 19 but the difficulty has arisen over the failure of the
statute to define the term "employee."
In 1939 and 1940 the Internal Revenue Service ruled that neither
an individual proprietor nor a partner qualify as an "employee" so as
to be able to take advantage of this plan. 20 Thus the physician seeking to utilize this income-spreading plan could do so only by organizing a corporation or hiring himself out professionally to a corporation.
In either event he faced the wrath of the medical association or, in
most states, the rule against the corporate practice of medicine and
perhaps both. However, the definitional section of both the 193921 and
195422 Codes seemed to make it possible for a group of doctors to join
themselves in a private association-neither corporation nor partnership under local law-which would be taxable as a corporation since
the latter 'is defined as including an "association." In the case of
Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 23 the Supreme Court held that
an unincorporated association which transacts business as if it were
incorporated is taxable as a corporation. The Court has also held
that an association may be taxed as a corporation even though it is
not recognized as a legal entity under local law and despite the fact
that its stockholders remain individually liable for its debts. 24 In
deciding the case of Morrissey v. Commissioner,2 the Supreme Court
undertook to state the criteria which would qualify an association
for tax treatment as a corporation. These criteria which apparently
were the source of the new regulations26 were as follows:
1. The entity should hold the property embarked in the corporate
undertaking.
2. There should be centralized management.
3. It should be secure from termination or interruption by death
19. 53 Stat. 67 (1939) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a) (1).
20. I.T. 3268, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 196; I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 64.
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

§ 7701(a) (3).

53 Stat. 469 (1939).
269 U.S. 110 (1925).
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924).
296 U.S. 344 (1935).
The proposed regulations cite the Morrissey case as authority.
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of an owner.
4. Beneficial interest should be transferable without affecting the
continuity of the enterprise.
27
5. Personal liability of the participants should be limited.
Organizations having the characteristics set out in the Morrissey
case have gained the name by which they are known, not from that
case, but from Kintner v. United States. 28 In the Kintner case eight
doctors who had theretofore practiced as partners formed an association. Their association established an employee pension trust, the
member doctors assuming that they were employees. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that any contribution to the trust by
the association was income to the doctors and taxable as such. The
court, while holding that the association was taxable as a corporation
under then-existing definitions of "association" and "partnership" in
the regulation, approved the criteria of Morrissey.2 9 In this connection
the court stated that even though the association met only three of
the above tests it nevertheless more closely resembled a corporation
than a partnership so that the doctors could be classified as employees
for tax purposes. 30 It should be noted that a corporation could not
legally engage in the practice of medicine under the laws of Montana, 31
a further indication that local state laws are not determinative of
classification for federal tax purposes.
Soon after this decision was affirmed by the ninth circuit,M the
Internal Revenue Service published a notice of nonacquiescence.33 The
next year, however, the Commissioner reversed himself on this point
and in the language of this ruling he accepted the Kintner result unequivocally:
It is now the position of the Service that the fact that an association
establishes a pension plan under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 . . . is not determinative of whether such organization will

27. 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
28. 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952). See also Galt v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Texas 1959), which cites the Kintner case.
29. 107 F. Supp. at 978, 979.
30. For a discussion of this case, see 40 IowA L. REv. 663 (1955); Mackay
Pension Plans and Associations Taxable as Corporations for Professional
Persons,10 Sw. L.J. 281 at 282 (1956).
31. A corporation can not meet the requirements of the Montana licensing
statute. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1003 (1947). See also Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), in which the court held a trust that
was established by a group of doctors taxable as a corporation although in
Illinois where the trust was established it was illegal for a corporation to
practice medicine. It is interesting to note that in the Pelton case the
Commissioner was in favor of the trust being taxed as a corporation, inconsistent with his position in Kintner.
32. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
33. REV. RuL. 56-23, 1956-1 CUm. BuLL. 598. "The ... position expressed in
the case of United States v. Arthur R. Kintner et ux, 216 Fed. (2d) 418, will
not be accepted by the Internal Revenue Service as a precedent in the
disposition of other cases involving similar fact situations."
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be classified as a partnership or an association taxable as a corporation.

The usual test will be applied in determining whether a particular
organization of doctors or other professional group has more of the
characteristics of a corporation than a partnership.3 4
This ruling further stated that the criteria to be used in establishing
an association taxable as a corporation would be published at a later
date. The proposed regulations3 5 listed the criteria to be used in
determining whether an organization is to be considered an "association," defined many terms which might be subject to misconstruction, 36
and cited examples of how certain types of organizations would be
37
classified.
Although some difficulties may arise under these new regulations,
they give clear and useful guidelines to doctors wishing to take advantage of the income-spreading procedures of section 402 and the
professional organizations formed for this purpose should be acceptable to the medical association. Also, in view of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Morrissey case, judicial approval is almost
assured. These regulations probably will not be effective until 1961,3
but they represent the views of the Internal Revenue Service so it
39
would seem a taxpayer could safely act under them.
Even though these "associations" have not legally incorporated,
they often so resemble a corporation that any other type organization
would be called a de facto4° corporation or corporation by estoppel. 41
In such case they would have violated the rule against practice in
the corporate form of many states and would be subject to an injunction or even a fine. However, as has been stated earlier,42 such practices probably will not be questioned if the entire organization is
managed and staffed by doctors.
As a general rule, in the absence of statute, unincorporated associations cannot sue or be sued in the association name, but an action may
be brought against the association for torts of an agent acting within
the scope of his employment if brought against the aggregate members
34. REv. RUL. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 886.

35. Note 17 supra.
36. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), (c), (d), (e), 24 Fed. Reg. 833-34

(1959).

37. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e), 24 Fed. Reg. 834 (1959).
38. 24 Fed. Reg. 833 (1959).
39. In spite of the tax advantages which doctors gain through the "unincorporated association," such an organization has been called hazardous in at

least one publication, SHARTEL & PLANT, THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 256

(1959). The authors state that such an organization may be called a
corporation on one occasion and a partnership on another, usually to the
disadvantage of the members and the person who undertakes leadership may
be held personally -liable for group activities, as an employer.
40. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 21 (1946).
41. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 31 (1946).
42. See note 3 supra.
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of the association. 43 It is most likely that this rule will be applied to an
unincorporated association of doctors even though it sufficiently resembles a corporation to get the above tax advantages. It is not
improbable, however, that the courts will rule that the associations
are de facto corporations or corporations by estoppel and allow the
suit in the corporate name. In either event the basis of the vicarious
liability of the association or its members for the torts of its employees
is respondeat superior,44 and there is no vicarious liability if the
employee is merely an independent contractor.
With the coming of regulations allowing doctors the tax advantages
of corporate employees, the doctors will probably be more solidly
behind the positions of the AMA in favor of the prohibition against
the corporate practice of medicine. For example, at least one state
group, the Tennessee State Medical Association, has recently adopted
a resolution against practicing medicine in the corporate form,45 and
there have been no recent reports of state associations taking the
opposite position. The American Hospital Association which seems
to lead the opposition to the corporate practice rule 46 does not attack
the rule as being intrinsically bad but takes the position that it is
being incorrectly applied. It is insisted by this group that when a
corporation receives payments for the professional services of a
physician it does not necessarily follow that the corporation is engaging in the practice of medicine. 47 This statement could very easily
hold a solution to the problem which would be acceptable to both
sides. The solution would not abolish the rule but limit and clearly
define its application by a list of exceptions: First of all, it would
seem possible to allow non-profit corporations and corporations
managed and staffed entirely by doctors to engage in the practice of
medicine since from all indications they do so in spite of the rule;48

and secondly there seems to be no valid agreement against allowing
doctors to be "employed" by hospitals as long as the capacity in which
they serve is that of an independent contractor. Thus the doctor
would be a physician first with his first loyalty to his patient controlled by the rules of the American Medical Association, while the
hospital would handle the administrative problem and receive the
43. Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 266 (4th Cir.

1943); Pandolfo v. Bank of Benson, 273 Fed. 48 (9th Cir. 1921). See also
Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 383
(1924).

44. REsTATEMENr (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 216, 219 (1) (1958).
45. Resolution of Tennessee State Medical Ass'n (April 12, 1960), to be
reported in Vol. 53, No. 6 Journal of the Tennessee Medical Ass'n (June 1960).
46. The pamphlet cited in Note 3 supra contains an excellent discussion
of pros and cons of the rule from the standpoint of the American Hospital
Association.
47. Note 3 supra,at 30.
48. Note 10 supra.

